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COMMENT
TRASH TORT OR TRASH TV?: FOOD LION,
INC. V. ABC, INC., AND TORT LIABILITY OF
THE MEDIA FOR NEWSGATHERING
I don't like to hurt people.... I really don't like it at all. But in
order to get a red light at the intersection, you sometimes have
to have an accident.
-Jack Anderson, Investigative Journalist'
Although criticism of the press is certainly not new,2 the
media has recently come under increasing scrutiny for what
critics see as a more intrusive style of tabloid journalism.4 The
1 A Muckraker with a Mission, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 3, 1972, at 53, 55.
2 It is noteworthy that even over a hundred years ago, the press was held in low
esteem, as it is today. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right of Pri-
vacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 196 (1890) ("The press is overstepping in every direction
the obvious bounds of propriety and of decency."); see also Everette E. Dennis, In-
ternal Examination: Self-Regulation and the American Media, 13 CARDOZO ARTS &
ENT. L.J. 697, 699 (1995) (noting that, as early as 1890, the public was disturbed by
the extensive investigating into the lives of prominent citizens).
3 The generic terms "the media," and "the press" will be used throughout this
Comment. Unless noted otherwise, the terms will be used interchangeably. Noted
First Amendment attorney Floyd Abrams argues that there is " 'nothing intrinsi-
cally unique about broadcast journalism as opposed to print journalism which
makes the principles in ... [the Food Lion] case more applicable to one than an-
other.' " Russ Baker, In Greensboro: Damning Undercover Tactics as "Fraud,"
COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., Mar.-Apr. 1997, at 28, 29; see also Lovell v. City of Grif-
fin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938) ("The press in its historic connotation comprehends
eve 7 sort of publication which affords a vehicle of information and opinion.").
See Ann Sjoerdsman, Daily Break: Journalism, Don't Shoot Messenger; Study
Message, VA.-PILOT & LEDGER STAR, Sept. 2, 1997, at E4, available in 1997 WL
12453955 (comparing the press conduct in the Princess Diana incident with that of
ABC in the Food Lion story, and predicting that the nation "will try to carve out
laws directed at harassing paparazzi that do not infringe upon constitutional pro-
tections"). Some critics of media techniques have come from within the industry it-
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First Amendment generally immunizes the press against liabil-
ity to public figures for damages resulting from the publication of
unfavorable material.6  Critics assert that this protection has
self. Washington Post editor Ben Bradlee criticized a 1978 60 Minutes program
where the producers set up a Chicago tavern to record a city inspector taking bribes.
Bradlee deplored the use of misrepresentation to get a story, no matter how worth-
while the results might be. See Clarence Page, Good-bye Nellie Bly! Undercover is
Interred, BALTIMORE SUN, Feb. 14, 1997, at 17A.
'Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press .... U.S. CONST. amend. I. The provisions of the First Amendment have been
applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, thus state laws must
meet the same constitutional requirements as acts of Congress. See City of Cin. v.
Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 412 n.1 (1993) (citing Stromberg v. Califor-
nia, 283 U.S. 359 (1931)). See generally Zechariah Chafee, The Great Liberty: Free-
dom of Speech and Press, in FOUNDATIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE AMERICAN CON-
STITTJTION 52-87 (Alfred H. Kelly ed., 1958) (tracing the development of the
freedoms of speech and press and concluding that the framers of the Constitution
intended that protecting the press must weigh heavily when examining the relative
importance of potential restrictions). James Madison made clear that he understood
the potential harm of the press, but balanced that harm with the benefits of a free
press:
Some degree of abuse is inseparable from the proper use of every thing,
and in no instance is this more true than in that of the press .... [Ilt is bet-
ter to leave a few of its noxious branches to their luxuriant growth, than,
by pruning them away, to injure the vigor of those yielding the proper
fruits. And can the wisdom of this policy be doubted by any one who re-
flects that to the press alone, checkered as it is with abuses, the world is
indebted for all the triumphs which have been gained by reason and hu-
manity over error and oppression... ?
James Madison, Report on the Virginia Resolutions, in 4 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL
STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 546, 571
(Jonathon Elliot ed., photo. reprint 1937) (1836).
The Free Press clause, like many in the Constitution, has been the subject of
continual debate as to its meaning and scope. See generally T. BARTON CARTER ET
AL., THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE FOURTH ESTATE: THE LAW OF MASS MEDIA 31-
46 (6th ed. 1994) (explicating various theories on the bases of freedom of speech).
Justice Stewart argued that the Free Press guarantee is a "structural" protection,
separate and apart from other individual rights such as speech and religion. See
Potter Stewart, "Or of the Press," 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 633 (1975) (noting that
"[tihe publishing business is, in short, the only organized private business that is
given explicit constitutional protection."). Justice Burger disagreed, arguing "the
history of the Clause does not suggest that the [Framers] contemplated a 'special' or
'institutional' privilege" for the press. First Natl Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 798
(1978) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
6 The protection was first afforded in cases of defamation, but has gradually
been expanded to include other claims arising from publiation or broadcast. See,
e.g., Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988) (applying the actual
malice standard to an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim made by a
parodied public figure); Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 156-58 (1967)
(applying the actual malice standard to prove defamation of a public figure); New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283 (1964) (holding that a public official
must prove "actual malice" to sustain a claim for defamation). It is unsettled
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emboldened the press to use unlawful and tortious means in
newsgathering.7
Subjects of unfavorable or intrusive media investigations
have changed legal tactics and have brought actions against the
media under tort theories that differ from the traditional suits in
defamation and libel.8 Media supporters have called these suits
whether a corporation is inherently a public figure for First Amendment purposes,
and thus would require the New York Times standard. Compare U.S. Healthcare,
Inc. v. Blue Cross, 898 F.2d 914, 939 (3rd Cir. 1990) (holding the corporation was
not a public figure in commercial disparagement claim), with Snead v. Redland Ag-
gregates, Ltd., 998 F.2d 1325, 1329 (5th Cir. 1993) (noting "[pirominent consumer
goods makers or merchants ... are much more likely to attain public figure status."),
and Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Jacobson, 713 F.2d 262, 273 (7th Cir.
1983) (noting in dicta, "if the purpose of the public figure-private person dichotomy
is to protect the privacy of individuals who do not seek publicity or engage in activi-
ties that place them in the public eye, there seems [to be] no reason to classify a
large corporation as a private person"). See generally Norman Redlich, The Publicly
Held Corporation as Defamation Plaintiff, 39 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1167 (1995)
(examining the legal questions which must be addressed by corporations contem-
plating the initiation of a defamation suit).
7 See John J. Walsh, et al., Media Misbehavior and the Wages of Sin: The Con-
stitutionality of Consequential Damages for Publication of Ill-Gotten Information, 4
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1111, 1113-14 (1996). One court said "[in the age of
'channel surfing,' news organizations are hard-pressed to disseminate information
in a manner that will capture the viewers [sic] attention." Baugh v. CBS, Inc., 828 F.
Supp. 745, 754 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (footnote omitted); see also Marc Gunther, Prime
Time News Blues; Magazine Shows Try to Regroup After a Bad Year, WASH. POST,
Sept. 17, 1995, at G7 (noting "competition and ratings pressure ... [have driven]
down the quality ofjournalism on the magazines [and] ABC, in particular, has been
hit with a flurry of lawsuits, particularly over hidden-camera reporting").
8 See, e.g., Berger v. Hanlon, 129 F.3d 505, 513 (9th Cir. 1997) (allowing a claim
for trespass against The Cable News Network and Turner Broadcasting System,
which secretly recorded a federal Fish and Wildlife Service search of the plaintiffs
property); Desnick v. ABC, Inc., 44 F.3d 1345, 1347 (7th Cir. 1995) (denying the
plaintiffs assertion that an undercover investigative report of an ophthalmic clinic
constituted trespass and fraud); Medical Lab. Management Consultants v. ABC,
Inc., No. CIV-95-2494-PHX-ROS, 1997 WL 405908, at *5 (D. Ariz. Mar. 27, 1997)
(refusing to dismiss claims of numerous torts regarding the surreptitious recording
of plaintiffs in the investigation of faulty pap smear tests); Sussman v. ABC, Inc.,
971 F. Supp. 432, 435 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (dismissing claims of fraud and surreptitious
recording in investigation of phony tele-psychics); Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cit-
ies/ABC, Inc., 887 F. Supp. 811, 811-12 (M.D.N.C. 1995) (addressing various tort
claims arising from an undercover investigation of sanitary conditions in a super-
market); Russell v. ABC, Inc., No. 94C5768, 1995 WL 330920 (N.D. Ill. May 31,
1995) (addressing the claims of intrusion, invasion of privacy, and wiretap violations
for an investigation of sanitary conditions in the commercial fish industry).
Defamation, however, remains a useful weapon for subjects of questionable
media coverage. In December 1996, a jury awarded a Florida state record $10 mil-
lion to a plaintiff who claimed he was libeled by ABC News' 20/20 program. See
Beatrice Garcia, In Miami: Paying for Technique, Colum. Journalism Rev. Mar.-
Apr. 1997, at 33; cf Purcell v. Bankatlantic Fin. Corp., 85 F.3d 1508, 1510 (11th Cir.
1998]
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a "wave of 'trash torts.' "' Rather than seeking damages for the
publication of injurious reports, plaintiffs have claimed that the
newsgathering activities of the media prior to publication were
tortious. ° Such plaintiffs have argued that the media does not
have any special constitutional protections in gathering news,
seizing upon the Supreme Court's general statement that
"generally applicable laws do not offend the First Amendment
simply because their enforcement against the press has inciden-
tal effects on its ability to gather and report the news."" In a re-
cent federal action, a North Carolina jury awarded Food Lion,
Inc.' ("Food Lion") over $5.5 million in punitive damages from
Capital Cities/ABC" ("ABC") and certain reporters for trespass,
1996) (noting that the plaintiff in the libel case also settled a class action lawsuit for
$8 million involving the real estate investors 20/20 claimed plaintiff defrauded).
9 Alicia C. Shepard, Fighting Back, AM. JOURNALISM REV., Jan.-Feb. 1996, at
36. One critic of the Food Lion verdict feared that it would lead to "all kinds of nui-
sance actions about any journalist who is trying to uncover a story about an impor-
tant matter that the subject doesn't wish to have uncovered." Jane Kirtley, in The
NewsHour With Jim Lehrer: ABC-Malpractice (PBS television broadcast, Jan. 15,
1997) available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File. Critics claim that such ac-
tions will have the proverbial "chilling effect" on speech, and will deprive the public
of valuable information, such as the material exposed in the Food Lion story. John
R. Bull, Address to Pennsylvania Bar Ass'n Civil Litig. Section (Mar 27, 1997),
VrrAL SPEECHES, May 15, 1997, available in 1997 WL 10024419. Judge Posner
voiced similar concerns by remarking-
Today's "tabloid" style investigative television reportage, conducted by
networks desperate for viewers ... although ... often shrill, one-sided, and
offensive, and sometimes defamatory ... is entitled to all the safeguards
with which the Supreme Court has surrounded liability for defamation.
And it is entitled to them regardless of the name of the tort. ... If the
broadcast itself does not contain actionable defamation, and no established
rights are invaded in the process of creating it ... then the target has no le-
gal remedy even if the investigatory tactics used by the network are sur-
reptitious, confrontational, unscrupulous, and ungentlemanly.
Desnick v. ABC, Inc., 44 F.3d 1345, 1355 (7th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted).
'0 See supra note 8.
'" Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 669 (1991).
2Until the PrimeTime Live story broadcast, Food Lion was one of the fastest
growing grocery store chains in the country. See Jane E. Kirtley, Vanity and Vexa-
tion: Shifting the Focus to Media Conduct, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1069, 1097
(1996). Although Food Lion enjoys a reputation of being a local supermarket in the
South, it is actually owned by Etablissements Delhaize Freres et Cie "Le Lion" SA, a
multinational firm centered in Belgium. See Jonathan Yardley, The Food Lion Ju-
rors' Reverberating Roar, WASH. POST, Jan. 27, 1997, at C2.
13 In early 1996, the Walt Disney Co. completed a $19 billion acquisition of Capi-
tal Cities/ABC, Inc. See Disney Closes Acquisition, Signals Interest in Another,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 12, 1996, at B3. Disney later shortened the corporate name to
ABC. See Disney's Cap Cities/ABC Trims Unit Name to ABC, WALL ST. J., May 6,
1996, at B6.
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fraud, and breach of loyalty. 4 The damages stemmed from a
1992 PrimeTime Live undercover story which exposed unsani-
tary food conditions at Food Lion supermarkets in North and
South Carolina.' 5
The litigation was sparked in 1992, when ABC's legal de-
partment and management approved proposals by two Prime-
Time Live producers to conduct an investigation of Food Lion.'
Once management approved the use of undercover cameras for
the investigation, the producers sought employment at various
14 See Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., No. 6:92CV00592, 1997 WL
735490, at *13 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 19, 1997). The same jury had earlier held ABC liable
for $1,402 in compensatory damages. See id. Food Lion, naturally, was pleased with
the decision. Tom Smith, the chairman and CEO of Food Lion stated "this case was
not just about money, it was about right and wrong." Jury Awards Food Lion More
Than $5.5 Million in Punitive Damages, PR NEWSWiRE, Jan. 22, 1997, available in
LEXS, News Library, Curnws File. Richard L. Wyatt, attorney for Food Lion hoped
the jury award would "be an effective reminder to ABC that it needs to follow the
laws of this country." Id. Roone Arledge, then president of ABC News, stated that
the verdict was "really a war against investigative reporting .... If the jury's punitive
award stands, it will help protect powerful institutions that do wrong .... " Roone
Arledge, Hidden Cameras Find the Truth, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 1997, at 19.
Citing the Supreme Court's decision in BMW of North America v. Gore, 517
U.S. 559 (1996), which held that punitive damages are unconstitutional if they are
grossly excessive, the trial judge later reduced the punitive damages to $315,000
holding the ratio between punitive and compensatory damages to be
"constitutionally unsustainable." Food Lion, 1997 WL 735490, at *13. Food Lion ac-
cepted the reduced award, but has appealed the court's ruling that the supermarket
chain was not entitled to recover $1 billion in lost profits and stock value it lost after
the broadcast. See Scott Andron, Food Lion Appeals Judge's Ruling Concerning
Lawsuit Against ABC, GREENSBORO NEWS & REC. (N.C.), Nov. 11, 1997, at B4,
available in 1997 WL 14476402. ABC has also filed a notice to appeal, seeking to
have all damages overturned. See Scott Andron, ABC News Appeals Food Lion Ver-
dict, GREENSBORO NEWS & REC. (N.C.), Oct. 28, 1997, at Bi, available in 1997 WL
14474432.
15 See Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 887 F. Supp. 811, 815
(M.D.N.C. 1995). "The ABC report described many unsanitary - and distinctly un-
appetizing - food handling practices at Food Lion: workers preparing sandwiches
without gloves and altering expiration dates on deli products; old chicken tarted up
with barbecue sauce; stinky fish rinsed with bleach." Amy Singer, Food, Lies, &
Videotape, AM. LAW., Apr. 1997, at 57.
16 See Singer, supra note 15, at 58. There is considerable dispute over how ABC
and PrimeTime Live first became interested in doing a story on Food Lion. The net-
work claimed that the story was suggested to them by a public interest group that
aided whistleblowers, after employees had reported abuses of food safety practices.
See Kirtley, supra note 12, at 1097. Food Lion, however, believed that ABC was
prompted by a labor union that had unsuccessfully tried to organize Food Lion
workers for over ten years. See id. The court held that both communications oc-
curred virtually simultaneously and were connected. See Food Lion, 887 F. Supp. at
814.
1998]
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Food Lion stores. To ensure that the producers were hired,
they "utilized means including the mails and interstate wire fa-
cilities to create false identities and backgrounds, complete with
supporting documentation," including fake r6sum6s and false
references demonstrating previous experience. 8 Two separate
Food Lion supermarkets eventually hired both producers as at-
will employees. 9 While working, the producers wore hidden
cameras0 and filmed the activities of fellow employees.2' Por-
tions of the film were recorded in areas not open to the general
public.' Their hidden cameras captured images of other Food
Lion employees bleaching and selling out-of-date meat and fish,
as well as repackaging and reselling food that had been thrown
in garbage bins.' After filming approximately forty-five hours of
video footage, the producers quit their positions under false pre-
tenses2
Food Lion did not seek an injunction to prevent the broad-
cast of the PrimeTime Live report.2 However, prior to the No-
vember 1992 scheduled air date, Food Lion filed a suit for dam-
ages against ABC. The complaint set forth fourteen different
causes of action, but did not allege defamation.26 District Court
17 See Food Lion, 887 F. Supp. at 814.
'8 Id On one application, a producer claimed " 'I really miss working in a gro-
cery store, and I love meat wrapping .... I would like to make a career with the com-
pany.'" See Singer, supra note 15, at 59.
"See Singer, supra note 15, at 58-59.
20 A common misperception is that the case concerned the propriety of using
hidden cameras and microphones. The court rejected Food Lion's claim that their
use in this instance equated to mail and wire fraud, and the jury never addressed
the issue. See Food Lion, 887 F. Supp. at 819. However, the tabloid media has con-
centrated on the hidden camera aspect in its coverage of the story. Geraldo Rivera
devoted an entire show to the issue of the media's use of hidden cameras. See Ger-
aldo: Hidden Camera: Right or Wrong? (Syndicated television program, Apr. 3,
1997), available in 1997 WL 10271597. Mr. Rivera ignored the Food Lion jury
foreperson's repeated denial of the importance of hidden cameras in their decision.
See id.
21 See Food Lion, 887 F. Supp. at 816.
See id. at 815-16.
23 See Stuart Taylor, Jr., Bad Food, Bad Taste, Bad Verdict; Huge Punitive
Damages Against ABC in Food Lion Case Are Unwarranted, FULTON COUNTY DAILY
REP., Feb. 7, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Fulton File.
24 See Singer, supra note 15, at 59.
2See id. Food Lion's attorneys felt that a suit for an injunction would be unsuc-
cessful. They did, however, meet with ABC's general counsel prior to the broadcast.
See id.
2 See Kirtley, supra note 12, at 1098. Food Lion publicly maintained that the
report was false, and that many of the scenes were staged by the reporters, but a
magistrate dismissed a belated attempt to add a libel claim during the proceedings.
[Vol. 72:185
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Judge N. Carlton Tilley refused to dismiss most of these claims '
and rejected ABC's arguments that the producers' actions were
protected by the First Amendment.' Citing the Supreme Court's
decision in Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., the court held that the
laws that applied to Food Lion's claims of fraud, trespass, and
breach of loyalty were "generally applicable laws which do not
target the press."29 The court, however, relied on the Supreme
Court's decision in Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell"0 and held
that Food Lion could not recover damages to its reputation aris-
ing out of the broadcast of the PrimeTime Live report.3'
This Comment examines the two issues that the Fourth Cir-
cuit will likely address in the Food Lion appeal. Part I considers
ABC's claim that the network is constitutionally privileged to
engage in routine newsgathering practices and is therefore not
liable to Food Lion. Although the Supreme Court has not di-
rectly ruled on the issue, this Comment examines the case law
leading up to the Food Lion case. Additionally, Part I asserts
that there are other means to ensure that the media is not un-
duly burdened and concludes that a better way of balancing the
competing interests is to refrain from immunizing the press for
non-publication related damages. Part II argues that the district
court correctly applied traditional defamation jurisprudence by
denying Food Lion damages for loss of reputation allegedly
caused by ABC's report. Part Ill discusses various proposals to
reconcile the rights of those targeted by investigative reports,
and how such proposals would impact the right of the public to
receive information without undue regulation. This Comment
See Singer, supra note 15, at 57-65 (providing a detailed description of the events
before and after the litigation). The court instructed the jury to assume that the
broadcast was truthful. See id. at 64.
27 See Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 951 F. Supp. 1217, 1224, 1233
(M.D.N.C. 1996) (upholding state Unfair Practices statutory claim, and common law
fraud, trespass, negligent supervision, civil conspiracy, and breach of fiduciary duty
claims). But see Food Lion, 887 F. Supp. at 824 (dismissing claims of violations of
Civil RICO and federal wiretapping statutes).
28 See Food Lion, 887 F. Supp. at 821.
29 Id. at 824 (quoting Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 670 (1991)).
2' 485 U.S. 46 (1988). See infra notes 115-117 and accompanying text.
' Id. In the year after the broadcast, Food Lion's company sales plummeted, at
least 88 stores were closed, and over 1,000 employees were laid off. See Singer, su-
pra note 15, at 58. In September 1997, the supermarket announced plans to close 61
stores and layoff 3,100 workers in the Southwest and attributed it to the Food Lion
story. See Food Lion to Close 61 Stores and Lay Off 3,100 Workers, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 19, 1997, at D3.
1998]
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supports an approach which would allow an aggrieved party to
recover all compensatory, non-publication damages arising from
the tortious conduct, but prevent plaintiffs from recovering pu-
nitive damages unless the conduct is criminal or reckless. Such
an approach would prevent a chilling effect on speech.
I. THE SEARCH FOR CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION FOR
NEWSGATHERING
The Supreme Court has generally applied a strict scrutiny
standard to content-based governmental regulations restricting
speech.32 In cases where the government wishes to regulate con-
duct, and the conduct has speech elements, the Court has been
more permissive and has allowed limited regulation of such
"expressive conduct."' Laws regulating conduct that does not
contain speech elements need only have a rational basis to be
upheld.' Early cases established that the press is not exempt
from generally applicable laws unrelated to the content of speech
such as labor laws, 5 antitrust laws,36 copyright laws, 7 and non-
"2See, e.g., Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 231 (1987)
("[Tihe state must show that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state
interest and is narrowly drawn to achieve that end."); Minneapolis Star and Tribune
Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 591 (1983) (noting that the state
bears a heavy burden to justify action that singles out the press).
See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (creating a four-part
test which provides that conduct combining speech and non-speech elements can be
regulated if. the "regulation is within the constitutional power of the government; ...
furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; ... the governmental
interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and ... the incidental re-
striction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the
furtherance of that interest."); see also Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 117 S. Ct.
1174 (1997) (upholding the Cable Television Consumer Protection Act, which re-
quires cable systems to reserve channels for local broadcast television); Barnes v.
Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 561 (1991) (upholding a public indecency statute
that prohibits dancers at adult entertainment establishments from dancing in the
nude); City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 790 (1984) (upholding a
Los Angeles ordinance that prohibited campaign signs on public property); Buckley
v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 15-23 (1976) (applying the O'Brien test in striking down cam-
paign expenditure limits that unconstitutionally impacted the campaigner's First
Amendment rights).
s'See West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943) (noting
that heightened scrutiny is required only when First Amendment protection is in-
volved).
s See Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132-33 (1937) ("The publisher of
a newspaper has no special immunity from the application of general laws. He has
no special privilege to invade the rights and liberties of others ... . The regulation
here in question has no relation whatever [sic] to the impartial distribution of
news.").
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discriminatory tax laws.38
When the media claims that the First Amendment protects
them from liability from tort lawsuits brought by private citi-
-zens, it claims, in effect, that such lawsuits constitute an im-
permissible regulation on speech.39 This regulation (whether in
the form of a statute or common law) does not fit neatly into one
of the categories mentioned above. Rather, tort liability on its
face essentially regulates conduct only. In New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan,' however, the Supreme Court recognized that regu-
lating even false speech concerning public officials must be con-
strained in order to avoid impeding the flow of information to the
public.
41
The Court has often given greater First Amendment protec-
tion to the press than to the general public, most notably in the
area of prior restraints.42 Lower courts have given this protec-
38 See Citizen Publ'g Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131, 139 (1969) (holding that
the negotiation of a joint operating agreement between two papers and subsequent
price fixing violated the Sherman Act); Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342
U.S. 143, 155-56 (1951) (upholding the enjoinment of a newspaper from further at-
tempts at monopolizing interstate commerce in violation of the Sherman Act); As-
sociated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945) (noting that allowing an ex-
emption of antitrust laws for the press would actually impede free speech because
other prospective publishers would not be able to publish).
37 See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 578-79 (1977)
(holding that the First and Fourteenth Amendments do not immunize the press
from liability for infringement of the "right of publicity" where the plaintiff sought
remuneration for the unauthorized broadcast of his performance).
88 See Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936) (striking down a
state licensing tax on selling newspapers, but noting "[ilt is not intended by any-
thing we have said to suggest that the owners of newspapers are immune from any
of the ordinary forms of taxation for support of the government"); see also Murdock
v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 112 (1943) (differentiating between a permissible tax
on the income of a person who engages in activities protected by the First Amend-
ment, and an impermissible tax imposed on that person for the privilege of engaging
in those activities).
' See Allen v. Combined Communications Corp., 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2417,
2420 (Colo. Dist. Ct. 1981) (recognizing the uncertainty in the amount of protection
to grant to newsgathering). In Allen, the court ruled that the media is free from li-
ability unless "1) the reporter knew that he/she was committing a trespass or com-
mitted the trespass in reckless disregard of that fact; or 2) ... the Plaintiff suffered
damage as a result of the trespass." Id.
0 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
41 I& at 279 ("A rule compelling the critic of official conduct to guarantee the
truth of all his factual assertions - and to do so on pain of libel judgments virtually
unlimited in amount - leads to a comparable 'self censorship.' ").
2 See LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1039-54 (2d ed. 1988).
Prior restraints doctrine bars pre-publication supression of speech. See id. at 1040.
The Supreme Court first applied this doctrine in Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697
19981
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tion regardless of the newsgathering conduct.' Thus, the pri-
mary protection afforded to the media is that publication itself
can not be curtailed, but the media is not immune from subse-
quent civil sanctions. In certain cases the Court has refused to
absolve the media from liability despite blameless conduct in
gathering the information." Despite this, the Court has asserted
that "lit is not] suggested that newsgathering does not qualify for
First Amendment protection; without some protection for seek-
ing out the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated."4
However, the Court has not explicitly extended this protection to
pre-publication and newsgathering conduct, and it is unclear
(1931) (striking down a state law which applied public nuisance law to the publica-
tion of "scandalous and defamatory" newspapers). See TRIBE, supra, at 1039.
For modem day examples of prior restraints Supreme Court jurisprudence, see
CBS, Inc. v. Davis, 510 U.S. 1315, 1318 (1994), which noted that "[ilf CBS has
breached its state-law obligations, the First Amendment requires that [the plaintiff]
remedy its harms through a damages proceeding rather than through suppression
of protected speech," Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1979),
which held unconstitutional a statute prohibiting the unauthorized publishing of the
names of youths charged as juvenile offenders, Landmark Communications, Inc. v.
Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 838 (1978), which held that the First Amendment does not
allow for a criminal penalty for publisher of confidential judicial proceedings, Ne-
braska Press Ass'n v. Stewart, 427 U.S. 539, 558 (1976), which stated that the state
had to meet a "heavy burden" to justify prior restraint of press from publishing ad-
missions made by a criminal defendant to police, New York Times Co. v. United
States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971), which rejected the government's attempt to pro-
hibit publishing of Pentagon Papers, and Bantam Books v. Sullivan, 372 U.S 58, 70
(1963), which struck down a book censorship program and noting the "heavy pre-
sumption against [the] constitutional validity" of a prior restraint.
See In re King World Productions, Inc., 898 F.2d 56, 59-60 (6th Cir. 1990)
(criticizing a television news magazine for surreptitious videotaping of plaintiff, but
vacating a temporary restraining order preventing broadcast of the videotape);
Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1973) (restricting further activities of a pa-
parazzi photographer, but refusing to enjoin publication of the photographs); Wolf-
son v. Lewis, 924 F. Supp. 1413, 1435 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (enjoining defendants from
further harassing activities, but refusing to enjoin the right to broadcast the result
of the prior activities). See generally Timothy B. Dyk, Newsgathering, Press Access,
and the First Amendment, 44 STAN. L. REV. 927, 928-29 (1992) (citing "the Supreme
Court's willingness to interpret the First Amendment as affording the press a broad
range of freedom from restraints on publication ... [and] argu[ing] that it is both ap-
propriate and desirable that the press enjoy a special constitutional right of access
in newsgathering").
4See, e.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977) (finding
television station liable for copyright infringement for publishing plaintiffs "human
cannonball" act despite the truthffulness of the story and no evidence of trespass).
See generally Robert M. O'Neil, Tainted Sources: First Amendment Rights and
Journalistic Wrongs, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1005 (1996) (discussing varied
levels of newsgathering conduct with regard to First Amendment rights).
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972).
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whether newsgathering is as "constitutionally significant" as de-famatory speech.'
A. Supreme Court Precedent
In Time Inc. v. Hill,47 the Court addressed an invasion of
privacy claim for the publication of material which allegedly
placed the plaintiff in a false light.48 In Hill, Time magazine
published a false article reporting that a new play portrayed the
experience of the plaintiffs family, which had been held hostage
by three escaped convicts.49 The Court held that because the
Hills' story was of legitimate public interest, the plaintiff could
not recover damages under New York's right of privacy law ab-
sent a showing of reckless falsity.5
In his concurring and dissenting opinion, Justice Harlan
briefly discussed the power of a state to impose liability for im-
proper media tactics: "No claim is made that there was any in-
trusion upon the Hills' solitude or private affairs in order to ob-
tain information for publication. The power of a state to control
and remedy such intrusion ... cannot be denied but is not here
asserted."52 While the Court specifically declined to rule on tort
liability for newsgathering," a majority of the Court rejected
Justice Harlan's proposal to hold the press to a "duty of making
46 Paul A. Lebel, The Constitutional Interest in Getting the News: Toward a First
Amendment Protection From Tort Liability for Surreptitious Newsgathering, 4 WAI.
& MARY BILL RTS. J. 1145, 1150 (1996).
47 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
4 A discussion of false light privacy is outside the scope of this Comment. For
an explanation of this area of law, see, for example, Cox Broad. Co. v. Cohn, 420
U.S. 469 (1974), Cantrell v. Forest City Publ'g Co., 419 U.S. 245, 252-53 (1974),
which upheld the validity of an invasion of privacy claim despite the absence of an
actual malice standard of proof, William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383
(1960), for an outline of false light and other privacy torts, and Ruth Gavison, Pri-
vacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L. REV. 421 (1980), which advocates a com-
mitment to privacy as a legal value and notes the limitations of the law in protecting
Priva'85 U.S. at 377-78.
0 N.Y. CIv. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50 & 51 (McKinney 1992) (providing for both civil
and criminal causes of action for the unauthorized use of a person's "name, portrait,
or picture").
51 See Hill, 385 U.S. at 397.
62 Id. at 404 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citation
omitted).
' "Nor do we intimate any view whether the Constitution limits state power to
sanction publication of matter obtained by an intrusion into a protected area, for
example, through the use of electronic listening devices." Id. at 384 n.9.
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a reasonable investigation," for false light claims.' 4 Soon after
Hill, a New York court noted that the Supreme Court "implicitly
rejected [that] standard, perhaps because it would force the
courts to act as wide-ranging critics of the manner of exposition
used by the press."55 Regardless, the Court seemed to be more
concerned with the media's behavior in deciding to publish the
information, than in the techniques used to gather it.
In Branzburg v. Hayes,56 the Court did address the press'
pre-publication conduct. The Court decided the issue of whether
a reporter has a "newsman's privilege" not to reveal confidential
sources, despite being subpoenaed to testify before a grand jury. 7
The Court rejected the reporters' claim that forcing them to re-
veal confidential sources would cause future sources to refuse to
furnish newsworthy information, "to the detriment of the free
flow of information protected by the First Amendment."58 The
Court did not find any evidence that "there would be a signifi-
cant constriction of the flow of news to the public,"59 and held
that because the First Amendment did not allow the press to
have a "special immunity from the application of general laws,"0
the press was not exempt from being required to testify before a
grand jury.6' The Court balanced "the public interest in possible
" Id. at 409. Note, however, that unlike Food Lion, the plaintiffs in Time v. Hill
were not public figures.
Costlow v. Cusimano, 311 N.Y.S.2d 92, 95 (App. Div. 1970). The plaintiff in
Costlow sued over the publication and exhibition of photographs and a story regard-
ing the deaths of two of the plaintiff's children who had trapped themselves in the
family refrigerator. See id. at 93. The court found that because the subject matter
was an area of legitimate public interest and the portrayal was accurate, the par-
ents could not sue under New York's privacy statute. Id. at 94.
Subsequent Court decisions have placed doubt upon Time, Inc. v. Hill's central
holding. See Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986) (utilizing
a different standard of simple falsity as opposed to reckless falsity in cases where
the plaintiff is a private figure but the issue is of public concern); Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (declining to apply the actual malice standard to
private figures in defamation actions even if the issue is of public concern).
408 U.S. 665 (1972).
"See id. at 686 (determining whether "the First Amendment interest asserted
by the newsman ... [is] outweighed by the general obligation of a citizen to appear
before a grand jury or at trial").
r Id. at 680.
rId. at 693.
0 Id. at 683 (quoting Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132-33 (1937)).
61 See id. at 667. ABC recently unsuccessfully claimed such a privilege involving
a subpoena ordered by Whitewater Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr seeking the
transcript and videotape of a PrimeTime Live interview with Susan H. McDougal.
See In re Grand Jury Subpoenas American Broad. Cos., Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1314,
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future news about crime," with "the public interest in pursuing
and prosecuting those crimes reported to the press by infor-
mants."' Thus the Court held against the reporters only after
the state had demonstrated that it had a compelling interest in
obtaining their testimony in a grand jury hearing.' However the
Court did not address the press' newsgathering practices in gen-
eral, beyond noting that the press is not immune from laws of
general applicability.' The case is ambiguous, perhaps pur-
posely so, regarding the amount of protection, if any, that should
be granted to the press for newsgathering conduct.' Moreover,
Branzburg addressed only the impact of governmental require-
ments on the press and not the impact of private parties through
civil actions.66
The Court directly addressed the issue of private citizens'
suits against the media in Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 67 a case
that is a bit of a twist on Branzburg. In Cohen, a confidential
source of information sued the publisher of a newspaper for
breach of contract and for misrepresentation for revealing his
1316-17 (E.D. Ark. 1996); see also In re Grand Jury Subpoena to Maguire, 615
N.Y.S.2d 848, 849 (Westchester County Ct. 1994) (holding PrimeTime Live produc-
ers had no privilege to withhold out-takes of an interview with a murder suspect).
Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 695.
63 See id. at 708.
See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Powell emphasized that the Branzburg
holding should not be interpreted as inhibiting the press where legitimate First
Amendment interests exist. See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 710 (Powell, J. concurring)
(asserting that a balance must be struck on a case by case basis between the re-
porter's right to withhold the name of a confidential source and the legitimate need
of law enforcement); see also David F. Freedman, Note, Press Passes and Tres-
passes: Newsgathering on Private Property, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1298, 1307 (1984)
(arguing that subsequent reliance on Branzburg by courts should be reconsidered
because the case "both was ambiguous and relied on inapposite precedenf). See
generally Eugene Cerruti, "Dancing in the Courthouse": The First Amendment Right
of Access Opens a New Round, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 237 (1995) (tracing the Court's
interpretation of the Free Press Clause relating to the media's right of access to the
news). The Supreme Court subsequently restricted the protection afforded the me-
dia in instances where the Court felt that the restrictions would have little impact
on publication. See Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 566 (1978) (holding that
a search warrant for confidential files of a student newspaper only burdened publi-
cation "incremental[ly]," and was not sufficient to make a "constitutional differ-
ence").
6 See State v. St. Peter, 315 A.2d 254, 255 (Vt. 1974) ("ITIhe language and atti-
tude of the Branzburg majority does not indicate an entire absence of concern for
the newsgathering function so relevant to the full exercise of the First Amendment.
The opinion confines itself to grand jury proceedings and trials.").
501 U.S. 663 (1991).
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name, despite promising not to divulge it." The Court held that
the First Amendment did not bar the plaintiffs promissory es-
toppel claim against the newspaper's publisher.69
Justice White, writing for the majority, emphasized that the
Court's earlier decisions that granted constitutional protection to
the press were limited to circumstances in which the press pub-
lished "truthful, lawfully obtained information."7" Justice White
explained, however, that the First Amendment does not confer a
right of the press to disregard laws of "general applicability."
71
Finding that promissory estoppel is such a law, Justice White
upheld Cohen's claim.72 Echoing Branzburg, the Court held that
"See id. at 666. The plaintiff, Dan Cohen, was a campaign worker for a Minne-
sota gubernatorial candidate, who had obtained potentially embarrassing docu-
ments about his candidate's opponent. See id. at 665. He contacted a number of
media sources offering the documents in exchange for a promise of confidentiality.
See id. Two newspapers printed the story, and, after much deliberation, also identi-
fied Cohen as the source of the information. See id. at 666. For a detailed descrip-
tion of the events leading up to the news company's decision to identify Cohen as the
confidential source, see Daniel L. Levin & Ellen Blumberg Rubert, Promises of Con-
fidentiality to News Sources After Cohen v. Cowles Media Company: A Survey of
Newspaper Editors, 24 GOLDEN GATE L. REV. 423, 425-432 (1994). The newspaper's
editors felt not only that the information provided by Cohen was important, but that
Cohen's actions so close to the election itself were newsworthy. Additionally, the de-
fendant justified breaching the agreement because Cohen's expectation of confiden-
tiality " 'while so brazenly distributing the material was ridiculous.' " Id. at 431
(citation omitted). After his name was published as the source of the information,
Cohen was fired from his job. See Cohen, 501 U.S. at 666.
6See Cohen, 501 U.S. at 665.
70 Id. at 669. See, Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989) (holding that a
newspaper was protected from liability for publishing the lawfully acquired name of
a rape victim); Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'g Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979) (holding publisher
not liable for publishing a lawfully obtained juvenile delinquent's name); Landmark
Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978) (holding statute imposing
criminal sanctions for publishing legally acquired confidential review proceedings
unconstitutional); see also Pearson v. Dodd, 410 F.2d 701 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied
395 U.S. 947 (1969) (holding that claim against a newspaper that lawfully receives
documents that were unlawfully copied by source is not actionable). But see Natoli v.
Sullivan, 606 N.Y.S.2d 504, 509 (Sup. Ct. 1993), affd, 616 N.Y.S.2d 318 (App. Div.
1994) (declining to extend Smith and B.J.F. to prohibit liability for publication for
legally acquired, but illegally intercepted telephone conversations and stating,
"[a]lthough the material published here was of public interest, it cannot be said to
be material of paramount public significance or import"). The Cohen Court rejected
the Minnesota Supreme Court's holding that the promises made by the newspapers
arose" 'in the classic First Amendment context of the quintessential public debate
in our democratic society.' " Cohen, 501 U.S. at 673 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(quoting Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 457 N.W.2d 199, 205 (Minn. 1990).
71 Cohen, 501 U.S. at 670.
72 See id. (noting that promissory estoppel "does not target or single out the
press").
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"enforcement of such general laws against the press is not sub-
ject to stricter scrutiny than would be applied to enforcement
against other persons or organizations." 3 Moreover, the Court
found that an award of compensatory damages did not have con-
stitutional significance and thus declined to balance the interests
of the plaintiff and the value of the information. 4
Food Lion and Cohen are similar in some respects and dif-
ferent in others. In both cases the claims did not arise from the
publication of the harmful material. Thus, the plaintiffs could
have alleged both claims without publication or broadcast.75 In
73 Id. In dissent, Justice Blackmun argued that the circumstances in Cohen
were indistinguishable from Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988),
in which the Court applied the New York Times "actual malice" standard to a public
figure's claim for damages against a magazine publisher based on the tort remedy of
intentional infliction of emotional distress. Hustler, 485 U.S. at 56. Justice Black-
mun believed that there was no discernable difference between the promissory es-
toppel claim in Cohen and the emotional distress claim in Hustler, and argued
"[there is no doubt that Virginia's tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress
was 'a law of general applicability' [also] unrelated to the suppression of speech."
Cohen, 501 U.S. at 675 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
One commentator agreed that the Cohen majority was at odds with Hustler, ac-
cusing the Court of "formalistic labelling [sic]." Susan M. Gilles, Promises Betrayed:
Breach of Confidence as a Remedy for Invasion of Privacy, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 77
(1995) (summarizing the Court's inconsistent application of the First Amendment as
follows "if an action can be labelled as contract or possibly property, then the First
Amendment is cast aside. In contrast, if the action acquires the label of tort, it faces
strict scrutiny and presumptive unconstitutionality"). Similarly, Justice Souter did
not believe "the fact of general applicability to be dispositive." Cohen, 501 U.S. at
677 (Souter, J., dissenting). He favored a balancing test to "articulate, measure, and
compare the competing interests involved in any given case to determine the legiti-
macy of burdening constitutional interests .... Id.
Another commentator argued that the Court's shift of emphasis away from the
information's impact on the public towards the applicability of the law in question,
allowed plaintiffs to circumvent the requirement for actual malice successfully to
bring a claim for damages for a media publication. See Kirtley, supra note 12, at
1085. "What began as an attempt to give news organizations breathing space to
support the 'profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public
issues should be uninhibited, robust and wide open,' [has] turned into a license for
the government to scrutinize and to regulate newsroom practices." See Eric B. Eas-
ton, Two Wrong Mock a Right: Overcoming the Cohen Maledicta that Bar First
Amendment Protection for Newsgathering, 58 Ohio St. L.J. 1135, 1137 (1997)
(arguing that Cohen has led to a "long series of lawsuits that aimfl to circumvent the
First Amendment protections that have been accorded to ... publication-dependent
torts ... by focusing not on the publication or broadcast, but on the newsgathering
process itself'). The media and its supporters undoubtedly feel that this has led to
the proliferation of the so-called "trash torts." Id. (quoting New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,270 (1964)).
74 See Cohen, 501 U.S. at 670 (holding that "the characterization of the payment
makes no difference for First Amendment purposes").
76 See Joseph W. Ragusa, Comment, Biting the Hand That Feeds You: The Re-
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Food Lion, the actual broadcast of the report was not relevant to
the liability of the network.76 The district court analogized the
producers' conduct to the publisher's breach of its promise of
confidentiality in Cohen, and determined that the producers'
conduct violated "generally applicable criminal or civil laws in
the name of newsgathering."77 However, the court failed to rec-
ognize that gathering news is fundamentally related to the pub-
lication of the results of the investigation, thus holding the me-
dia liable for such conduct may potentially chill speech. By
contrast, the enforcement of plaintiff's promissory estoppel claim
in Cohen can be distinguished because it may actually give con-
fidential informers more confidence that their identities will be
protected, thus beneficially increasing the flow of information to
the public.7"
B. Lower Court Cases
An early, widely influential case attaching tort liability to
newsgathering conduct is Dietemann v. Time, Inc.79 Two report-
porter-Confidential Source Relationship in the Wake of Cohen v. Cowles Media
Company, 67 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 125, 136 n.57 (1993) (noting that publication did
not trigger liability in Cohen; it was only evidence of the breach of the agreement).
7" Indeed, because Food Lion chose not to challenge the accuracy of the report,
the jury never viewed the actual PrimeTime Live broadcast, nor were they informed
of ABC's allegations against Food Lion. See Singer, supra note 15, at 58.
77 Food Lion, 887 F. Supp. at 822.
78 The Court in Cohen did not articulate this reasoning in their decision. How-
ever, one scholar opined that
[A] properly written decision in [Cohen] might well have reached the same
result as did the Court, but the analytical process would have been drasti-
cally different, focusing on the impact of any ruling on the functioning and
nature of society as it relates to the aspirations and goals of the First
Amendment.
Stanley Ingber, Judging Without Judgment: Constitutional Irrelevancies and the
Demise of Dialogue, 46 RUTGERS L. REV. 1473, 1649 (1994).
"449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971). In Dietemann, the Ninth Circuit expanded the
scope of California's privacy law to include "clandestine photography" and secret
recordation of the plaintiff in his home. Id. at 248. In an earlier case that did not
address tort liability, reporters were held in criminal contempt for photographing a
notorious killer at his sentencing, in violation of local law. See In re Mack, 126 A.2d
679 (Pa. 1956). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected the reporters' First
Amendment claims, holding that the freedom of the press "is subject to reasonable
rules" to maintain decorum and order in court proceedings. Id. at 681. Moreover, the
court felt that the privacy of the prisoner outweighed the press' rights in this in-
stance. See id. at 693. The court stated that the photographs "[did] not inform the
public as to any material factsB" nor served any useful purpose other than to
"pander to the lower tastes of some individuals," while the state had an important
interest in maintaining decorum in court proceedings. Id. at 682. The court noted
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ers employed by Life magazine, acting with the authority of the
Los Angeles District Attorney's Office, used a ruse to gain entry
into plaintiffs home, where defendants and authorities believed
he was running a fraudulent medicinal "healing" practice.0 The
defendants surreptitiously photographed the plaintiff
"examining" one of the reporters, and recorded their conversa-
tion with a hidden microphone."' Police officers eventually ar-
rested the plaintiff for practicing medicine without a license.
2
The plaintiff later sued Time, Inc. claiming that the defendant's
employees invaded his privacy when they entered his home
without permission. The trial court awarded the plaintiff gen-
eral damages of $1000."
The Ninth Circuit rejected Time, Inc.'s claim of constitu-
tional protection based merely on the subsequent publication of
that "[tihe essential rights of the First Amendment in some instances are subject to
the elemental need for order without which the guarantees of civil rights to others
would be a mockery." Id. at 681 (quoting Fitzgerald v. City of Philadelphia, 102 A.2d
887, 891 (Pa. 1954)). One judge authored a concurring opinion, stating plainly that
"while gathering of the news is an indispensable part of the privately owned news-
paper business, it is important to point out that freedom of the press does not give a
constitutionally protected right to gather news." I& at 685. (Bell, J., concurring and
dissenting in part) (citing United Press Ass'ns v. Valente, 123 N.E.2d 777, 778 (N.Y.
1954) (affirming a lower court order that excluded the press from a criminal pro-
ceeding)); see also Tribune Rev. Pubrg. Co. v. Thomas, 254 F.2d 883 (3d Cir. 1958)
(upholding a state court rule that forbade taking photographs in courtrooms).
The elegant dissent in Mack, which could wisely be quoted by defenders of the
press, argued that photography and newsgathering are both essential parts of free-
dom of the press:
Freedom of the press is not restricted to the operation of linotype machines
and printing presses. A rotary press needs raw material like a flour mill
needs wheat. A print shop without material to print would be as meaning-
less as a vineyard without grapes, an orchard without trees, or a lawn
without verdure.
Freedom of the press means freedom to gather news, write it, publish it
and circulate it. When any one of these integral operations is interdicted,
freedom of the press becomes a river without water. Gathering of news
embraces photographing of the news, printing of the photographs, and re-
production of the photographs in the finished newspaper.
Mack, 126 A.2d at 689 (Musmanno, J., dissenting).
"Dietemann, 449 F.2d at 245-46. Upon arriving at plaintiffs home, the report-
ers told plaintiff that they had been sent by his friend. See id.
"' See id. at 246. One of the reporters complained of a lump in her breast. The
plaintiff diagnosed the cause of her condition to be "rancid butter" that the reporter
had eaten years earlier. See id.
See id. The plaintiff subsequently plead no contest to two misdemeanor
charges. See id. at 247.
See id. at 245.
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improperly acquired information." The court held that defen-
dant's use of subterfuge to gain entry into plaintiffs home to
photograph him without his consent gave rise to a cause of ac-
tion.' The court interpreted Time, Inc. v. Hill to support the
proposition that the Constitution affords no protection to media
defendants for unlawful pre-publication acts.8 The court noted
"[publication] is not the foundation for the invocation of a privi-
lege. Privilege concepts developed in defamation cases and to
some extent in privacy actions in which publication is an essen-
tial component are not relevant in determining liability for in-
trusive conduct antedating publication."87
The Dietemann court's reading of Time v. Hill is suspect. As
previously discussed, in Hill the Supreme Court specifically re-
fused to offer a view on whether the Constitution affords protec-
tion to reporters for improper newsgathering tactics. Diete-
mann did, however, state the underlying principle upon which
courts, including the Cohen and Food Lion Courts, have upheld
plaintiffs' claims against the media:
The First Amendment has never been construed to accord
newsmen immunity from torts or crimes committed during the
course of newsgathering. The First Amendment is not a license
to trespass, to steal, or to intrude by electronic means into the
precincts of another's home or office. It does not become such a
license simply because the person subjected to the intrusion is
reasonably suspected of committing a crime.89
The unique facts of Dietemann can bolster the arguments of
media critics and supporters alike. Supporters of the press can
point to the fact that although the plaintiff held himself out as a
"healer," he was not a public figure.0 Additionally, the reporters
in Dietemann invaded the plaintiffs home to gather the story.
Although in Food Lion the district court found that the reporters
See id. at 249-50.
5See id at 250.
8See id.
87 Id. at 249-50.
8See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
"Dietemann, 449 F.2d at 249.
The district court held that Dietemann was not a public figure. See Diete-
mann v. Time, Inc., 284 F. Supp. 925, 930-31 (C.D. Cal. 1968), affd, 449 F.2d 245
(9th Cir. 1971) (concluding that the plaintiff was not a public figure because he did
not advertise his healing services and conducted his practice in his own home, which
was not open to the public). On appeal, the Ninth Circuit addressed Tine's argu-
ment that Dietemann's home was open to the public, but did not consider whether
he was a public figure. See Dietemann, 449 F.2d at 247.
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trespassed into private areas of the store, because the tortious
conduct involved in Food Lion involved a public corporation, the
Fourth Circuit may hold that the tortious conduct was not so in-
timately related to the injured party's privacy.9
On the other hand, media critics' arguments can be buoyed
by the fact that in Dietemann the Ninth Circuit found liability
even though the Los Angeles authorities approved the investiga-
tion. Food Lion, and indeed many investigative reports, are not
backed by law enforcement and thus do not have the legitimacy
that such express backing arguably casts.92
9' See, e.g., Desnick v. ABC, Inc., 44 F.3d 1345, 1352-53 (7th Cir. 1995)
(distinguishing Dietemann in a claim of trespass by an eye clinic because the alleged
intrusion occurred in an office open to the public rather than in the plaintiffs home);
see also Deteresa v. ABC, Inc., 121 F.3d 460, 466 (9th Cir. 1997) (dismissing a claim
by a plaintiff who was surreptitiously taped answering questions about her obser-
vations of O.J. Simpson, because the facts did not "demonstrate a sufficiently offen-
sive invasion of privacy for an intrusion claim to lie").
9But see Berger v. Hanlon, 129 F.3d 505, 508 (9th Cir. 1997). In Berger, the
United States Attorney's office authorized the Cable News Network ("CNN") to ac-
company agents of the United States Fish and Wildlife Service to the home of a sus-
pected killer of bald eagles and hawks. The Ninth Circuit held that the cameras
served no valid law enforcement purpose and that the reporters violated the plain-
tiff's right to privacy. See id. at 513-14; see also Ayeni v. Mottola, 35 F.3d 680 (2d
Cir. 1994) (upholding a criminal defendant's right to privacy action where camera
crews filmed his home and family while accompanying law enforcement agents exe-
cuting a search warrant); United States v. Sanusi, 813 F. Supp 149 (E.D.N.Y. 1992)
(holding that plaintiff was entitled to the videotape made by reporters who accom-
panied law enforcement agents during a search of plaintiffs home). See generally
Brad M. Johnston, Note, The Media's Presence During the Execution of a Search
Warrant: A Per Se Violation of the Fourth Amendment, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1499 (1997).
Due to the proliferation of "reality based" television shows, in which camera-
persons accompany public officials into homes to record arrests or rescues, there has
been a corresponding increase in the number of suits brought by such citizens. Elsa
Y. Ransom, Home: No Place for "Law Enforcement Theatricals.--The Outlawing of
Police/Media Home Invasions in Ayeni v. Mottola, 16 LOY. L. ENT. L.J. 325, 325
(1996). The courts have generally upheld invasion of privacy and trespass claims
and have followed dictum in Branzburg that "[n]ewsman have no constitutional
right of access to the scenes of crime or disaster when the general public is excluded
.. " Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 684-85 (1972). In Miller v. NBC, 232 Cal.
Rptr. 668 (Ct. App. 1986), the court held that valid claims were established against
a television network whose reporters accompanied paramedics into the plaintiffs
home and videotaped lifesaving measures being administered to her husband. See
id. at 685. The court concluded that not allowing "unauthorized entry into the pri-
vate premises of individuals like the Millers does not place an impermissible burden
on newsgatherers, nor is it likely to have a chilling effect on the exercise of First
Amendment rights." 1d. Rather "[t]o hold otherwise might have extraordinarily
chilling implications for all of us; instead of a zone of privacy protecting our secluded
moments, a climate of fear might surround us instead." Id.; see also Berger, 129 F.3d
at 512 (reversing the district court and concluding that the plaintiff was entitled to
a reasonable expectation of privacy in buildings located on his property); Ayeni v.
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The underlying rule of Dietemann, that the Constitution
does not grant the media protection from liability for tortious
conduct while gathering news, is clearly the majority rule. 3 Be-
CBS, Inc., 848 F. Supp. 362, 368 (E.D.N.Y. 1994), affd, sub. nom., Ayeni v. Mottola,
35 F.3d 680 (2d Cir. 1994) (upholding a claim for invasion of privacy brought against
news reporters who accompanied police officers to plaintiffs home and filmed the
officers executing a search warrant); Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. Rptr.
2d 434 (Ct. App. 1996), review granted and opinion superceded by, 934 P.2d 1278
(Cal. 1997) (holding that automobile accident victims had a claim for intrusion
where the defendant videotaped the plaintiffs while they were being transported in
an ambulance).
Some courts have carved out an exception to this rule in cases where the media
defendant can demonstrate that the plaintiffs consented to the reporter's presence.
See, e.g., Baugh v. CBS, 828 F. Supp. 745, 757 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (dismissing trespass
and intrusion claims against a network whose reporter misrepresented herself as
being from the district attorney's office, because plaintiff had expressly consented to
the intrusion, although it was fraudulently acquired); Belluomo v. Kake TV & Radio,
Inc., 596 P.2d 832, 844 (Kan. Ct. App. 1979) (holding that plaintiffs revocation of
consent allowing defendant to photograph his restaurant became irrelevant after
the photographing had occurred). But see Copeland v. Hubbard Broad. Inc., 526
N.W.2d 402, 405 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995), affd, No. C7-97-733, 1997 WL 729195
(Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 25, 1997) (distinguishing Baugh because the plaintiff did not
consent to have her home videotaped by a reporter impersonating a veterinary stu-
dent). A limited amount of courts have held that the consent need not be express to
be invoked. See Florida Publ'g Co. v. Fletcher, 340 So.2d 914, 917 (Fla. 1976), rev'd
in part, 431 U.S. 930 (1977) (finding implied consent because it was "common usage,
custom and practice for news media to enter private premises and homes to report
on matters of public interest or a public event"). But see Berger, 129 F.3d at 516
(holding that the plaintiff did not consent to videotaping of his property, which did
not serve a valid law enforcement purpose, even though federal agents had tempo-
rary control over plaintiffs property while executing a search warrant); Miller, 232
Cal. Rptr. at 683 ("One seeking medical attention does not thereby 'open the door'
for persons without any clearly identifiable and justifiable official reason who may
wish to enter the premises where the medical aid is being administered."); Green
Valley Sch. v. Cowles Fla. Broad., Inc., 327 So.2d 810, 819 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976)
(holding that finding implied consent in such circumstances "could well bring to the
citizenry of this state the hobnail boots of a [Niazi stormtrooper equipped with
glaring lights invading a couple's bedroom at midnight with the wife hovering in her
nightgown in an attempt to shield herself from the scanning TV camera"); Anderson
v. WROC-TV, 441 N.Y.S.2d 220, 223 (Sup. Ct. 1981) (rejecting Fletcher and noting
that such implied authority "does not extend by invitation, absent an emergency, to
every and any other member of the public, including members of the news media");
Prahl v. Brosamle, 295 N.W.2d 768, 779 (Wis. Ct. App. 1980) (distinguishing
Fletcher because, although defendant's reporter accompanied police to the scene of a
shooting, no police had requested his help). For a general discussion of "sidekick
journalists," see Ransom, supra note 92, at 350-53.
9 See, e.g., Berger, 129 F.3d at 511-12; Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986, 996 (2d
Cir. 1973) (holding that there is "no threat to a free press in requiring its agents to
act within the law"); Wolfson v. Lewis, 924 F. Supp. 1413, 1433 (E.D. Pa. 1996)
(enjoining defendant news magazine from conducting surveillance and attempting
"ambush interviews" of plaintiffs, HMO executives and their family and finding it
"difficult to understand how hounding, harassing and ambushing the Wolfsons
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cause it does not allow the courts to evaluate the newsworthi-
ness of the information gathered, it provides a bright-line stan-
dard for courts considering media conduct.' The court in Food
Lion relied on the Dietemann rationale in upholding the super-
market's claim.95
The Food Lion court rejected ABC's argument that according
to the Seventh Circuit's analysis in Desnick v. ABC, Inc.," no
trespass occurred because Food Lion's management consented to
the reporter's presence.97 In Desnick, the plaintiff sued ABC for
would advance the newsworthy goal [of exposing the high salaries of health care ex-
ecutives] ... or how such conduct would advance the fundamental policies underly-
ing the First Amendment"); Miller, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 683 ("The clear line of demar-
cation between the public interest served by public officials and that served by
private business must not be obscured."); Le Mistral, Inc. v. CBS, 402 N.Y.S.2d 815,
817 (App. Div. 1978) (reinstating an award for compensatory damages for trespass
because "the First Amendment is not a shibboleth before which all other rights must
succumb"); Stahl v. Oklahoma, 665 P.2d 839, 842 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983) (affirming
sentences of newspersons convicted of trespass, emphasizing that the press does not
have a constitutional right of access to places not available to the general public);
Prahl, 295 N.W.2d at 781 (finding no constitutional privilege to trespass in gather-
ing the news).
Some courts have granted greater First Amendment protection for newsgather-
ing tactics, thus support exists for a dismissal of Food Lion's actions against ABC.
See, e.g., Desnick v. ABC, Inc., 44 F.3d 1345 (7th Cir. 1995) (dismissing a claim of
trespass brought against ABC by plaintiffs depicted on PrimeTime Live as practitio-
ners of fraud); Allen v. Combined Communications, 7 Media. L. Rep. (BNA) 2417,
2419 (Colo. Dist. Ct. 1981) (dismissing as "pieties" the language of Dietemann and
Branzburg stating the press has no special rights to gather the news, and arguing
that the dividing line between newsgathering and news publication is not as clear as
those cases intimate: "In an age of instant communication who is to say whether a
television reporter standing in a field reporting his/her story by means of one of
those video devices ... is at that moment gathering the news or disseminating it?");
Cassidy v. ABC, Inc., 377 N.E.2d 126, 132 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978) (dismissing an inva-
sion of privacy claim by a police officer who was secretly filmed while arresting a
model in a massage parlor because "no right to privacy against intrusion can be said
to exist with reference to the gathering and dissemination of news concerning dis-
charge of public duties[" and public officials implicitly "consent to informing the
general public by all legitimate means regarding his ... public duties."); Costlow v.
Cusimano, 311 N.Y.S.2d 92, 9-97 (App. Div. 1970) (holding that plaintiffs invasion
of privacy claim failed because defendant, "a radio station employee investigating
the death of two children," was acting under the protection of the constitutional
guarantee of freedom of the press when he entered plaintiffs property to photo-
graph the plaintiffs children).
See Walsh, et al., supra note 7, at 1126 (arguing that by undertaking an ex-
amination of the newsworthiness of the information gathered, "courts will surely be
creating dangerously subjective and ad hoc exceptions").
' See Food Lion v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., No. 6:92CV00592, 1997 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 11344, at *15 (M.D.N.C. July 9, 1997).
44 F.3d 1345 (7th Cir. 1995).
" See Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 951 F. Supp. 1217, 1222
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a variety of claims arising from a PrimeTime Live expos6 on its
ophthalmic clinic." Using hidden cameras, the network filmed
reporters posed as patients receiving false diagnoses for cata-
racts from the clinic.99 Judge Posner, who has been described as
"no pro-press patsy,"" dismissed all claims against the network,
including fraud and trespass, except the plaintiffs claim for
defamation."0 '
In dismissing plaintiffs claim for trespass, the Desnick court
held that the clinic effectively consented to the reporters' entry,
notwithstanding the fact that the reporters acquired consent
through misrepresentation."2 While conceding that a logical ra-
tionale for this rule is elusive, the court concluded that "[tihe fact
is that consent to an entry is often given legal effect even though
the entrant has intentions that if known to the owner of the
property would cause him for perfectly understandable ... rea-
sons to revoke his consent."0 3
Judge Posner similarly dismissed the clinic's claim of fraud,
(M.D.N.C. 1996).
98 See Desnick, 44 F.3d at 1347. The producers of the series had contacted Dr.
Desnick, the head of the clinic, about doing a story on his work, and reassured him
that the investigation would not "involve 'ambush' interviews or 'undercover' sur-
veillance and that it would be fair and balanced." Id. at 1348.
See id.
'0 Stuart Taylor, Bad Food, Bad Taste, Bad Verdict; Huge Punitive Damages
Against ABC in Food Lion Case are Unwarranted, FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP., Feb.
7, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Fulton File.
'0' See Desnick, 44 F.3d at 1348-49. The court allowed the defamation charge to
go forward, finding questions of fact regarding PrimeTime Live's allegedly false re-
porting of a "rigged" glare machine used by the plaintiffs. See id.
See id. at 1351-52. Although not cited, this logic parallels that of Baugh v.
CBS, 828 F. Supp. 745 (N.D. Cal. 1993). See supra note 92. Judge Posner held that
the tort of trespass was designed to protect "the inviolability of a person's property,"
rather than that of the person. Desnick, 44 F.3d at 1352. Despite the misrepresen-
tation, "the entry was not invasive in the sense of infringing the kind of interest of
the plaintiffs that the law of trespass protects; it was not an interference with the
ownership or possession of land." Id. at 1353. The court noted that a contrary rule
would be ridiculous:
There must be something to this surprising result. Without it a restaurant
critic could not conceal his identity when he ordered a meal, or a browser
pretend to be interested in merchandise that he could not afford to buy.
Dinner guests would be trespassers if they were false friends who never
would have been invited had the host known their true character, and a
consumer who in an effort to bargain down an automobile dealer falsely
claimed to be able to buy the same car elsewhere at a lower price would be
a trespasser in the dealer's showroom.
Id. at 1351.
103 Id.
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which was based on the clinic's alleged reliance upon a series of
assurances by the defendants.' The court characterized the
network's statements as puffery, not to be taken seriously by in-
telligent professional physicians such as Dr. Desnick.' 5 The
court concluded that the "so-called fraud was harmless."103
Although the court concluded that the network had not en-
gaged in tortious conduct, it nevertheless discussed the relation-
ship between the First Amendment and investigative reporting.
The court noted that the investigative process is entitled to the
same constitutional protections that the Supreme Court provides
for defamation, "regardless of whether the tort suit is aimed at
the content of the broadcast or the production of the broad-
cast." '7 Judge Posner further noted that if the content of the
segment is not defamatory and "no established rights are in-
vaded in the process of creating" the story, the targets of such
investigative news reports have no legal remedy "even if the in-
vestigatory tactics used by the network are surreptitious, con-
frontational, unscrupulous, and ungentlemanly."' Thus, be-
cause ABC violated no state tort laws, the plaintiffs could not
recover for the damages caused by the network's activities.
104 See id. at 1354.
1'0 See id.
Investigative journalists well known for ruthlessness promise to wear kid
gloves. They break their promise, as any person of normal sophistication
would expect. If that is 'fraud,' it is the kind against which potential vic-
tims can easily arm themselves by maintaining a minimum of skepticism
about journalistic goals and methods.
Id. The court also relied on a quirk in Illinois law which, unlike most states, does
not recognize promissory fraud as actionable unless the misrepresentations are part
of a "scheme" to defraud. See id. (citing Willis v. Atkins, 106 N.E.2d 370, 377-78 (IlI
1952)). The court noted that a scheme to investigate bad medical practices did not
constitute a fraudulent scheme. See id. at 1355. However, the court intimated the
holding would be the same if decided on the law of other jurisdictions. See id. at
1354 ("No legal remedies to protect [the plaintiffs] are required, or by Illinois pro-
vided.").
100 Id. at 1355.
'0 Id. Because the court held that the network had not engaged in tortious con-
duct, the discussion of the constitutional implications is arguably dicta. See Andrew
B. Sims, Food Lion and the Media's Liability for Newsgathering Torts: A Symposium
Preview, 7 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 389, 398 n.44 (1997).
108 Desnick, 44 F.3d at 1355. But see Eduardo W. Gonzalez, Comment, "Get That
Camera Out of My Face!" An Examination of the Viability of Suing "Tabloid Televi-
sion" for Invasion of Privacy, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 935, 948 (1997) (arguing that be-
cause the purpose of tabloid television is to entertain rather than to inform, it is not
news, therefore, its producers should be prohibited from asserting a newsgathering
privilege).
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Judge Tilley distinguished the media's conduct in Desnick
from the conduct in Food Lion because in the latter case, the re-
porters' misrepresentation granted them access to areas where
only Food Lion employees were allowed. 9 Unlike Desnick, in
which the reporters only entered public areas, the reporters'
presence could be found to be "purely incidental to their jobs
with PrimeTime Live and that they hoped to be admitted to ar-
eas of the store not open to the general public to 'steal' that
which was otherwise not available to them-the images of those
areas.""
0
This argument is not persuasive and ignores the constitu-
tional implications of the purpose of the reporters' conduct. The
reporters, as employees of ABC, could not benefit from "stealing"
images from Food Lion, apart from contributing those images to
a successful broadcast. To examine the reporters' actions apart
from their newsgathering function ignores Desnick's principle
that absent a violation of an established right, the First Amend-
ment protects the media from liability.
Because the Food Lion court appears to have misread the
Desnick decision, the court would have been on firmer analytical
grounds if it had rejected the approach altogether, rather than
attempting to limit its holding. It could have subjected the net-
work to liability without ignoring constitutional implications.
An approach imposing compensatory damages on the media for
tortious conduct, if coupled with other protections, provides the
best balance between protecting the rights of the media to gather
information, and the rights of their targets not to have their pos-
sessory and personal rights violated. As discussed infra, the best
means for providing these protections is not by providing a lim-
ited constitutional immunity for the press, but by limiting the
damages recoverable to compensation for the direct harm caused
by the tortious conduct, and barring the recovery of punitive
damages.
II. MEDIA LIABILITY FOR PUBLICATION DAMAGES
Traditional tort jurisprudence allows an injured party to re-
10 See Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 951 F. Supp. 1217, 1222
(M.D.N.C. 1996) (finding that two ABC employees were working for Food Lion in
order to gain access to restricted areas of the stores).
10 Id. The court also noted that in Desnick, the reporters only entered offices
open to the public, while the Food Lion reporters were allowed to enter areas of the
stores not generally open to the public. See id. at 1223.
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cover all damages proximately caused by the tortfeasor's ac-
tions."' Therefore, barring any constitutional impediment to re-
covery, damages arising out of the publication of tortiously gath-
ered information are a proximate result of the conduct and, as
such, would be recoverable by the aggrieved party." Whether
the First Amendment provides such an impediment has not been
addressed directly by the Supreme Court, and is in considerable
dispute by the lower courts that have addressed the issue.1
Food Lion alleged damages resulting from the reporters'
misrepresentation and trespass, as well as reputation damages
resulting from the PrimeTime Live report."4 Relying on Hustler
Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell,"5 the court barred recovery of reputa-
tion damages."' In Hustler, the Supreme Court held that a pub-
lic figure alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress
arising from the publication of injurious statements about the
plaintiff cannot recover reputation damages without proving that
the statement was false and made with actual malice." The
1 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 917 (1977).
112 See James E. King & Frederick T. Muto, Compensatory Damages for News-
gatherer Torts: Toward a Workable Standard, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 919, 937
(1981).
13 Compare Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245, 250 (9th Cir. 1971) (holding
the defendant liable for all damages flowing from the publication of the ill gotten
material and stating that allowing damages did not chill freedom of expression; it
only chilled intrusive acts), with Baugh v. CBS, Inc., 828 F. Supp. 745, 756 n.5 (N.D.
Cal. 1993) (dismissing claims based on the actual publication of the story, but noting
that "these constitutional protections do not immunize pre-publication activities"),
and Costlow v. Cusimano, 311 N.Y.S.2d 92, 97 (App. Div. 1970) (holding that publi-
cation damages were not recoverable because they did not "flowf from the interfer-
ence with possession").
There is a dispute concerning this issue amongst commentators as well. Com-
pare Walsh, et al., supra note 7, at 1141 ("[The only real question a court should
ask is to what extent the injury resulting from the subsequent publication was, in
fact, proximately caused by the initial, intentional tortious or unlawful act.") with
Randall J. Turk, in Symposium, Panel I: Accountability of the Media in Investiga-
tions, 7 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 401, 424 (1997) (arguing that
reputational damages in the Food Lion case "were caused not by ABC's conduct but
by Food Lion's own labor and food handling practices" and thus should not be recov-
erable).
.14 See Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 887 F. Supp. 811, 822
(M.D.N.C. 1995).
15 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
16 See Food Lion, 887 F. Supp. at 823. The court noted that if Food Lion proved
its case to the jury, it would be able to recover non-reputational damages to the ex-
tent permitted under North Carolina law "without offending the First Amendment."
Id. at 824.
117 See Hustler, 485 U.S. at 56. In Hustler, the Court held that a public figure
must prove both the falsity of the material and actual malice to have a claim for in-
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Food Lion court distinguished Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.,118
where, by contrast, the plaintiff was seeking to recover damages
for breach of a promise, rather than injury to his reputation."
One critic has argued that the court "unnecessarily blurred the
distinction between reputation damages and publication dam-
ages," believing that Food Lion was entitled to all damages
flowing from ABC's tortious conduct under traditional tort prin-
ciples 20 However, the correct reading of Hustler appears to be
that plaintiffs are constitutionally proscribed from recovering
reputation damages arising from the publication of the offensive
material, unless the plaintiff can prove that the statements are
defamatory under the New York Times actual malice standard."
tentional infliction of emotional distress arising from the publication of the injurious
material. Id. (referring to the standard set forth in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254 (1964)). The case involved the claim of well known minister and politi-
cal activist, Jerry Falwell, against Hustler magazine based on its satirical portrayal
of him as having a drunken incestuous encounter with his mother in an outhouse.
See id at 47-48. In denying his claim, the Court "undertook a balancing test and de-
termined that the First Amendment interest of the Tundamental importance of the
free flow of ideas and opinions on matters of public interest and concern' outweighed
the state's interest in protecting public figures from emotional distress." Food Lion,
887 F. Supp. at 823 (quoting Hustler, 485 U.S. at 50). Because the plaintiff could not
show the parody to be a false statement of fact, and thus was not defamatory, the
emotional distress claim also could not be sustained. Hustler, 485 U.S. at 56-57; cf
Unelko Corp. v. Rooney, 912 F.2d 1049, 1057-58 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that while
defendants statements about plaintiffs product constituted verifiable fact, plaintiff
could not show the statements were false, thus product disparagement and tortious
interference claims were dismissed).
"8 501 U.S. 663 (1991).
'19 See supra notes 67-78 and accompanying text. The court felt that Food Lion's
claim for reputational damages arising from the broadcast were similar to a claim
for damages based on the "generally applicable law of intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress," and thus needed to meet the actual malice standard. Food Lion, 887
F. Supp. at 823. Therefore, Food Lion could not "recover any publication damages
for injury to its reputation as a result of the PrimeTime Live broadcast." Id.
12 Walsh, et al., supra note 7, at 1143. The author notes that under these tradi-
tional tort principles, "it seems clear that newsgathering defendants who commit an
intrusion, trespass, act of fraud, or break a promise [as did ABC], with the intent of
publishing information obtained thereby, could reasonably foresee both certain in-
juries caused by the antecedent unlawful act as well as additional losses flowing
from the publication." Id. at 1136.
2 Although the Food Lion court seemed to indicate that the supermarket could
recover nonreputational damages arising from the broadcast, it did not explain the
scope of the damages. See Food Lion, 887 F. Supp. at 823. Since the court assumed
that Food Lion was a public figure for purposes of constitutional analysis, this
Comment takes no position as to whether the same protection should exist regard-
ing reputational or nonreputational damages for private figure plaintiffs such as Mr.
Dietemann or victims of intrusions by "sidekick journalists." See supra note 92 for a
discussion of sidekick journalism.
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The Food Lion court correctly analyzed the relationship between
the two forms of damages as a blending, rather than a blurring.
The benefit of this approach is that it protects the dissemi-
nation of information regarding public figures, and is consistent
with traditional First Amendment jurisprudence. By limiting
damages to those arising from tortious conduct, the Food Lion
court implicitly recognized that the interests that tort law aims
to protect in imposing liability for trespass, fraud, and similar
torts fundamentally differ from those interests recognized in im-
posing liability for- defamation or false light invasion of privacy
where publication is an essential element of the tort.m
HI. STRIKING A BALANCE BETWEEN THE INTERESTS
There have been a number of ideas proposed to address the
uncertainties of the media's tort liability. While few commenta-
tors would disagree that the media should be liable for criminal
or particularly egregious conduct, these approaches run the
gamut from imposing liability on the media for any and all dam-
ages flowing from the tortious conduct,m to an almost blanket
immunity for routine or even unorthodox newsgathering tech-
niques.' Many theories fall between these two extremes, at-
tempting to balance the competing interests of the media to dis-
seminate the information and of the victims to recover for their
harm.' This Comment proposes an approach that remains con-
'2 See Pearson v. Dodd, 410 F.2d 701, 704 (D.C. Cir. 1969) ("[mntrusion does not
involve as one of its essential elements the publication of the information obtained.
The tort is completed with the obtaining of the information by improperly intrusive
means.") (footnote omitted); see also King & Muto, supra note 112, at 947 ("[The
interests at stake at the time of publication may differ from those at stake when the
published information is acquired").
m See Walsh, et al., supra note 7, at 1144 ("[All citizens and institutions ...
[including the media] must take full responsibility for all the consequences of their
transgressions, and pay the 'wages of sin.'"). See generally Branzburg v. Hayes, 408
U.S. 665, 683 (1972) (noting that "the press may not circulate knowing or reckless
falsehoods damaging to the private reputation without subjecting itself to liability
for damages, including punitive damages, or even criminal prosecution.").
1 See Easton, supra note 73, at 1215 (proposing a standard requiring a showing
of "deliberate wrongdoing in bad faith or outrageous conduct" in order to hold the
media liable for newsgathering); Kirtley, supra note 12, at 1106 (noting that no one
would suggest that routine newsgathering techniques would not be prohibited); cf.
Lyrissa C. Barnett, Note, Intrusion and the Investigative Reporter, 71 TEX. L. REV.
433, 437-38 (1992) (advocating immunity from liability for newsgathering activities
that~romote the public welfare).
More accurately, the balance is between the interest of the public to receive
truthful information against the interest of the public not to have personal and
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sistent with First Amendment jurisprudence and strikes an ap-
propriate balance between these interests. This approach would
allow victims to recover all compensatory damages arising di-
rectly from the media's misconduct, but would bar recovery of
punitive damages from the media."6
The benefit of a rule that does not limit the media's exposure
to liability for tortious conduct is that it provides a bright-line
rule to remedy aggrieved parties. There is popular appeal in
holding the media to the same standard as the general public.
Essentially, this is the standard that the Food Lion court used."7
Proponents of this view feel that there is no need for the media
to break laws in order to investigate a storyYm However, if
plaintiffs use these causes of action to recover from the media
without being required to meet the strict requirements of defa-
mation claims, the potential exists for an erosion of the existing
protections for the media. The cases that follow this approach
fail to recognize the impact that "neutral laws" have on the
transmission of important information, and the chilling effect
they might have on speech if applied blindly to the press.
If the Dietemann approach is followed, allowing Food Lion to
property rights damaged by the media. See, e.g., John L. Diamond, Rethinking Me-
dia Liability For Defamation of Public Figures, 5 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POLY 289
(1996) (criticizing the limited government intrusion model of sanctioning the media
only in extreme cases and proposing an approach that would limit damages to pro-
tect the media).
126 Media protection from punitive damages is one of the grounds of ABC's ap-
peal. See Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Judgment as a Matter
of Constitutional Law on Punitive Damages, Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities /ABC,
Inc., No. 95-00513 (M.D.N.C. 1997) (cited in Sims, supra note 107, at 393 n.27).
27 See Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 887 F. Supp. 811, 821
(M.D.N.C. 1995) ("lEinforcement of such general laws against the press is not sub-
ject to stricter scrutiny than would be applied to enforcement against other persons
or organizations.") (quoting Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 670 (1991)).
See, e.g., Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 691 ("It would be frivolous to assert ... that
the First Amendment, in the interest of securing news or otherwise, confers a li-
cense on ... [a] reporter or his news sources to violate valid criminal laws.").
One of the attorneys representing Food Lion commented, "I don't recall that
Woodward and Bernstein used fraud or hidden devices to gather their facts about
Watergate." John Walsh, in Counsel Connect Debates: Food Lion, Fraud, and Free
Speech, 147 N.J. L.J. 616 (1997). It is, however, unlikely that ABC would have been
able to achieve the same results without an undercover story, as " '[o]bservation of
practice is absolutely essential.' " Singer, supra note 15, at 65 (quoting Kathryn
Boor, professor of food microbiology at Cornell University). Testing of food samples,
for example, would not be effective because it cannot determine the age of the meat,
nor how it was contaminated. See id. Clearly the story would not have had the im-
pact without the undercover video.
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recover reputation damages out of the PrimeTime Live broadcast
risks an even greater suppression of speech. In New York Times,
Co. v. Sullivan, the Supreme Court held that a rule imposing
unlimited liability on the press for defamation of public officials
would not merely inhibit false speech, but chill all speech.m
Similarly, a rule imposing unlimited liability for newsgathering
would not only inhibit tortious conduct, but would inhibit legiti-
mate investigation of information clearly in the public's interest
to be disclosed.
The Desnick approach, which gives the media immunity un-
less an "established right" is violated, has the same advantage of
providing a bright-line standard. This approach recognizes that
the media does not have the same motivation as the general
public in committing tortious conduct when the media commits
tortious acts incidental to newsgathering. Therefore, imposing
liability only when an established right is violated ensures that
journalists do not desist from pursuing truthful investigative re-
porting."' This approach would require the adoption of a set of
ethical standards for the media that could be enforced if the con-
duct violated "established rights." 3' However, unless these
rights are clearly and uniformly defined under state law, there is
a risk of having rights defined by the arbitrary predilections of
individual courts, thus losing the advantage of certainty of appli-
cation.
Another standard would allow courts to use its decisionnak-
ing capacity to determine liability while considering public policy
factors. Under this approach, "[c]ourts ... balance the state in-
terest that is served by the legal rule sought to be applied
against the representative of the press arising out of the news-
gathering activity against the First Amendment interest that is
served by the acquisition of the information through that activ-
"' See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964) ("The rule thus
damroens the vigor and limits the variety of public debate.").
'See Kirtley, supra note 12, at 1109 (noting the disadvantage that the risk of
liability may cause journalists to avoid pursuing truthful stories regarding matters
of public concern).
'S See Dennis, supra note 2, at 698 (discussing the self-regulatory approaches to
media accountability, including recommendations for codes of ethics); Robert E.
Drechsel, Media Ethics and Media Law: The Transformation of Moral Obligation
Into Legal Principles, 6 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POLY 5, 8 (1992) (noting
the public's use of the media's moral obligations to legally bind the media to a code
of ethics it espouses).
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ity.""3' The primary public policy cited for using this balancing
test is that often there are areas of public concern which the gov-
ernment is unable or unwilling to investigate, or is itself sus-
pected of wrongdoing.13 3 Under this method, the courts factor in
the newsworthiness of the investigated matter to determine
whether there is an overriding justification for the techniques
used by the media to gather the information."M This approach
does not have the advantage of providing a bright-line standard
for the courts to judge the media's conduct. As one critic argues,
"[b]y measuring the newsworthiness of the subject matter
against the plaintiffs right to privacy, courts will surely be creat-
ing dangerously subjective and ad hoc exceptions.""5 The fun-
damental problem is the difficulty of determining what consti-
tutes a public issue important enough to justify granting the
media immunity for tortious conduct.3 6 A risk associated with
132 Lebel, supra note 46, at 1154.
'3 Numerous investigations have led to important disclosures which have often
resulted in significant societal change. For example, at the turn of the century, Up-
ton Sinclair's descriptions of working undercover in the Chicago meat packing in-
dustry in his novel The Jungle led to the founding of the Food and Drug Admini-
stration. See Upton Sinclair, The Jungle viii (Robert Bentley, Inc. ed., 1971)
(discussing the impact of the work on the meat inspection industry); Page, supra
note 4, at 17A. At about the same time, Nellie Bly went undercover to expose the
deplorable conditions in insane asylums. See id. Wall Street Journal reporter Tony
Horwitz won a 1995 Pulitzer Prize for his expos6 on food handling violations, poor
hygiene, and wretched working conditions in a chicken processing plant. See Susan
Paterno, The Lying Game, AM. JOURNALISM REV., May, 1997, at 40, 40.
"4 See Walsh, et al., supra note 7, at 1126.
I !d.
One solution to this problem is to " lay down broad rules of general applica-
tion' " as the Supreme Court did in the defamation context in Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 343-44 (1974). See Lebel, supra note 46, at 1154-55 (quoting
Gertz, 418 U.S. at 343-44). There have been few explications on how this would be
accomplished. One suggested approach is to excuse media conduct only in investi-
gations of "work-related activities" where the media can show that they had prob-
able cause to believe that the target was engaged in "illegal, fraudulent or poten-
tially harmful conduct." Barnett, supra note 124, at 449. Under the probable cause
standard, the media would have, for example, the same privilege as police to use
ruses to expose illegal conduct. See Stuart Taylor, Jr., in Counsel Connect Debates:
Food Lion, Fraud, and Free Speech, 147 N.J. L.J. 617 (1997). This would prevent the
media from engaging in "fishing expeditions." Barnett, supra note 124, at 449. How-
ever, giving the media, as private citizens, similar powers as law enforcement is
problematic. Such a standard, if taken at face value, would immunize the press for
virtually all damages inflicted on a target. Furthermore, if the theory is expanded to
include allegations of criminal activity by private persons, one can imagine the spec-
ter of "Sam Donaldson ... [stopping] drivers at a 'media sobriety checkpoint[]'"
James Clark, in Counsel Connect Debates: Food Lion, Fraud, and Free Speech, 147
N.J. L.J. 617 (1997).
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the balancing test approach is that courts may second-guess the
media as to whether the investigation under scrutiny is an im-
portant issue. It does, however, adequately protect private indi-
viduals who might suffer injury as a result of the pursuit of a
clearly unnewsworthy story.
A better and more practical approach would be to focus on
the damages aspect of the media's liability, rather than the
newsworthiness of the story. Limiting the recovery of public fig-
ures injured by investigative reports to direct compensatory
damages, without allowing punitive damages, prevents the im-
position of exorbitant damages where the plaintiff suffered little
actual harm from the tortious conduct. Implicitly this would
prevent business targets, such as Food Lion, from recovering
large damage awards for trespass, unless the reporters stole
trade secrets or caused serious physical harm to the target's
property. At the same time, this approach would permit recov-
ery for all damages directly related to the conduct. In cases
where the media's conduct harms an individual person, the in-
jured party would be able to recover damages for pain and suffer-
ing, thereby exposing the media defendant to significant liability
in clearly egregious cases.37
The purpose of punitive damages is to deter parties from
committing wrongful acts and punish blameworthy conduct. 8'
Because such damages are not intended to recompense injured
parties for tortious acts, the Supreme Court in Gertz found them
"wholly irrelevant" in defamation actions by private figures be-
cause plaintiffs need only show that defendants were negligent
Finally, this approach is flawed because it requires a media defendant faced
with a lawsuit to justify his belief after the fact that probable cause existed. Faced
with such a circumstance, a reporter may be forced to decide between incurring li-
ability for unsubstantiated probable cause or revealing a confidential informant,
thus risking liability under Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991). See su-
pra notes 67-78 and accompanying text.
137 For an example where such liability might have existed, see Wolfson v.
Lewis, 924 F. Supp. 1413, 1434-35 (E.D. Pa. 1996) which describes the harassment
of a pregnant HMO executive and her husband (also an lHMO executive) by a syndi-
cated news program which allegedly was aware that the family was receiving
anonymous death threats. The reporters were eventually enjoined from continuing
to harass the family, but an invasion of privacy suit was dropped just prior to oral
arguments of the appeal of the injunction, without any payment of money by the
news program. See U.S. Healthcare Execs Drop Lawsuit Against Inside Edition In-
vestigative Reporters with no Payment by Defendants, PR NEWSWIRE, Jan. 27, 1997,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
'38 See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 350.
1998]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
to recover."9 While the Food Lion court found ABC liable for in-
tentional tortious conduct rather than negligence, the principle
in Gertz is analogous, and both factors that concerned the Court
are present in the Food Lion case. The threat of litigation and
the negative publicity that follows provide a great deal of incen-
tive for the media to function within the boundaries of acceptable
conduct. The assumption that the media will only be dissuaded
from engaging in such conduct when they are punished with
large punitive damage liability is dubious.4 ' Furthermore, the
reporters' conduct could not be considered "reprehensible" be-
cause the reporters were merely pursuing a successful investi-
gative report and were not interested in harming Food Lion.
The Court in Gertz disallowed punitive damages in defama-
tion cases because of concern for irrational jury verdicts.'4 The
Court has also consistently held that the press cannot be held li-
able for the publication of truthful information of public signifi-
cance."" Plaintiffs have attempted to sue for torts other than
defamation in order to recover damages arising from the harmful
publication of truthful information. Given the courts' difficulty
differentiating between publication and newsgathering in de-
termining the media's tort liability, it is unwise to force juries to
make this distinction.
CONCLUSION
The strict proof requirements developed by the Supreme
Court in defamation actions have forced parties injured by unfa-
vorable but truthful reports to attempt to recover damages by
suing for the newsgathering techniques employed by the media.
This has led to confusion as to whether First Amendment safe-
guards can be extended to protect the media from such tort li-
ability or whether generally applicable tort laws have no First
Amendment constitutional significance. The Food Lion case rep-
139 Id.
140 This theory is perhaps evidenced by ABC's appeal of the punitive damages
award even after the damages were reduced to a relatively modest amount. See
Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 887 F. Supp. 811, 823 (M.D.N.C. 1995)
(dening recovery of reputational damages).
"[Jiuries assess punitive damages in wholly unpredictable amounts bearing
no necessary relation to the actual harm caused." Gertz, 418 U.S. at 350.1 See Smith v. Daily Mail Pubrg Co., 443 U.S. 97, 107 (1979) (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring); Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 454 (1976); Cox Broad. Corp. v.
Cohen, 420 U.S. 469,495 (1975).
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resents an opportunity for the courts to address this issue. The
circumstances did not involve obviously egregious media con-
duct, nor was the media clearly justified in the techniques em-
ployed. A sensible solution would hold the network liable for ac-
tual harm it caused in its pursuit of the story, but prevent Food
Lion from recovering punitive damages or damages arising out of
the broadcast itself. This result would be consistent with consti-
tutional jurisprudence and would strike an appropriate balance
between the competing interests of personal privacy and First
Amendment freedoms.
Charles C. Scheim"
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